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Phenomenology of the Other in Levinas
Dmitry Olshansky. Responsibility to the I: Phenomenology of the Other in Levinas // journal "Philosophy and Society". No. 1 (32), 2007 – p. 221 – 232

Review on Yale French Studies No. 104
“Encounter with Levinas” Ed. by Thomas Trezise. London: Yale University Press, 2004. – 148 p.
by Dmitry A. Olshansky


I can note an original selection of the papers for the collection “Encounter with Levinas”. From the contents of the collection is fraught with interesting reading. Among the authors there are both P. Ricoeur, who is known to be a classical philosopher, and academic researcher of Levinas E. Wyschogrod, and even feminist theorist L. Irigaray. When anyone familiar with secondary courses on Levinas’s though, one is most apt to focus on the recited authors. But one could also find new writers, whose names are known to the very few experts only, but whose texts give fresh outlook to reading Levinas. I mean first of all P. Crignon and E. Wyschogrod; their positions would be useful both to researchers of Levinas and to everyone, who interested in contemporary thought. One could also pay an attention to the diversity of the themes and tradition of reading Levinas; and it is an obvious merit of Thomas Trezise. This collection combines classical and fresh ideas, French and US authors, historic and analytic methods of text investigation, but at the same time, it keeps compositional integrity, consistency of narration and unity of editor’s conception. It is not only a conjunction of different views on Levinas, but also independent and original composition.

There are classical questions of Levinas studies are investigated more detailed by some authors. For example, Leora Batnitzky’s article “Encountering the modern subject in Levinas” [pp. 6 – 21] explores an influence of Cartesian and Husserlian legacy over Levinas. She turns back to root of phenomenology of Levinas and precisely, she researches “Levinas’s appropriation of Descartes’s philosophy in order to argue for a separable, independent subject”. [p. 6].[1] So she argues that Levinas just return to Descartes’s subject – object distinction; in Batnitsky’s words it looks like Levinas “seeks nothing less than to” ignore Heidegger and reaffirm Cartesian dualism: “Levinas moves back from Heidegger to Husserl”. [p. 11]. The author analyses original and secondary literature and coherently argues her position. Though I respect such a position, I share an opinion of those experts, who consider Levinas to be post-heideggerian thinker. It seems that Levinas was competent and serious thinker enough just to deny the arguments of his predecessors and opponents and just to reaffirm any outdated tradition. Both his methods of thinking and his view on Descartes and Husserl were a method and a view of post-heideggerian philosopher. No doubt that he looked for ethical (and religious) purport of Dasein and he was not agree with Heidegger’s over-personal Being without God, he was not also a disciple of Heidegger, therefore his phenomenology is not heideggerian. S. Moyn considers, “While Levinas did not criticize Heidegger in so many words, there is more in the comments than simple clarification”. [p. 45].[2] But even if he wanted to overcome Heidegger in some aspects [3] and he was not agree with some of his ideas, Levinas belong to the tradition of post-heideggerian phenomenology. As a critic of Heidegger he continues and develops the same tradition (not reject it) and therefore he confirms his relation and dependence on Heidegger’s positions. Paul de Man also mentioned about a kinship between Heidegger and Levinas: “The radical experience of voiced otherness as a way to a regained proximity can indeed be found as a dominant theme in Levinas and to have at least a submerged existence in Heidegger”.[4] Therefore I think Levinas to be post-heideggerian thinker rather, than post-cartesian or post-husserlain, but this is not excepts the roles of Descartes and Husserl in the philosophy of Levinas.

Samuel Moyn’s article “Transcendence, morality, and history: Emmanuel Levinas and the discovery of Soren Kierkegaard in France” [pp. 22 – 54] investigates another Levinas’s authority: Søren Kierkegaard. Moyn is known to be the author of some other meaty works on Levinas, and forthcoming book: “Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas between Theology and Humanity, 1928 – 1961”. The text has been written by a very competent expert in history of philosophy, therefore Moyn’s work in interesting both for researcher of Levinas and for historians of Western philosophy. S. Moyn maintain that Levinas “rejected the foundr of existentialism” [p. 22], but he “came to defend a Kierkegaardisn theology” [p. 46]. The author also considers that Levians follows Heidegger’s and Jaspers’s interpretation of Kierkegaard [p. 39], as well he shows re-discovery of Kierkegaard in France. He argues a wide Levinas’s contacts and interests in many spheres of philosophical though: in ethics, theology, and metaphysics. Moyn successfully combines many new biographical facts and analysis of Levinas’s though development. In such a way Moyn mentioned about relationship between Karl Barth [pp. 25 – 27] [5], his teacher Jean Wahl [pp. 28 – 30; 37 – 48] and precursor Franz Rosenzweig [pp. 34 – 37] [6], and he narrated about out-of-the-way communication between Levinas and Russian philosophers Alexandre Koyre, Lev Shestov, Rachel Bespaloff, Nicolas Berdyaev, whom he follows [p. 44]. It is well known about Dostoevsky’s influence over Levinas; and there are many authors trace his relationship with Russian existentialism of Dostoevsky. Moyn realizes a valuable comparison between Levinas and Lev Shestov [pp. 28 – 34]. Shestov indeed borrowed a lot of Kierkegaard’s ideas; this fact obvious for readers of his earlier works. Therefore some Russian researchers suppose Shestov not original in his existentialism. On the other hand, there is a number of Russian “proto-existentialist Russian writers like Chekhov, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy” [p. 30], who were popularized by Berdyaev and Shestov and by this reason were received by Western thinkers. Moyn’s text is an excellent example of historic-philosophical research, and I hope that his prospective book would be of the very same high quality.

Alain Toumayan’s text “‘I more than the others’: Dostoevsky and Levinas” [pp. 55 – 66] continues an investigation of these Russian roots in Levinas’s philosophy. Although Levians was Jewish thinker, he was closed enough to Russian orthodox though, in particular, borrowed from Dostoevsky. He precisely used Dostoevsky’s idea of responsibility for all; the author uses the famous quotation from The Brothers Karamazov in the title of his papers: “We are all guilty of all and for all men before all, and I more than the others”. He just mentioned Mikhail Bakhtin interpretation of Dostoevsky; and it is not enough to trace closely a development of Levinas’s conception of the Other. Bakhtin antedated many Levinas’s ideas and there are reasons to assert that Levinas was familiar with Bakhtin’s earlier works on Dostoevsky.[7] In his classical book on Dostoevsky of 1929 M. Bakhtin said “To posit the other I not as an object, but as a subject – this is the principle of Dostoevsky’s outlook”. [8] In the end of book Bakhtin said: “To be means to communicate dialogically… Therefore, a dialogue will never over”. [9] This words sounds very closed to Levinas’s ones: “The knowledge that absorbs the Other is forthwith situated within the discourse I address to him. Speaking solicits the Other. [...] In discourse the divergence that inevitably opens between the Other as my theme and the Other as my interlocutor, emancipated from the theme that seemed a moment to hold him, forthwith contests the meaning I ascribe to my interlocutor”.[10] For more details on comparison between dialogism in Bakhtin and philosophy of the Other in Levinas, see my article Bakhtin and Levinas on Religious Tradition of Dialogue in Fyodor Dostoevsky”. [11] The second reason to compare them is Levinas’s ethics and Bakhtin’s philosophy of act: Bakhtin’s “non-alibi in Being” and Lévinas’s equivalent of which would be something like “without reason for being (sans raison d’etre) or saying”.[12] For details on this question see K. Lee’s article “An Interesting Non-Alibi in Being: A Levinasian Encounter with Bakhtin”. [13] Therefore it seems that A. Toumayan overleaps such authoritative theorist as Bakhtin and simplifies a reception of Russian literature in Levinas, who also knew very well philosophical ideas of Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol, Turgenev, Tolstoy and others.

Luce Irigaray’s article “What other are we talking about?” [pp. 67 – 81] looks to be original philosophical work, not a research of Levinas. Therefore it is difficult to rate her writing from the historic-philosophical point of view. Therefore her re-reading of Levinas [14] seems to be “misreading of Levinas”, because “Irigaray is more interested in what she has to say than what Levinas has to say”. [15] Irigaray looks to prefer philosophical approach to reading Levinas, not to expound classical ideas, but create her own theory on the basis of Levinas’s though. At the same time she began her text with admission that she is not a disciple of Levinas and “there are some troubling similarities between our texts”. [p. 67]. So, her aim is to point out how difficult to recognize an alterity of the other; how difficult to turn to “to the insane, the worker, the foreigner, the child” from the point of view of egocentrism. Even Levinas “still does not recognize that the other lives in a world other than his”. [p. 69], like Husserl he labors under a delusion that the other is a projection of the I, that “the other is a very part of or participation in me” [p. 80]; therefore “the real of the other as other would again be annulled, submerged in a single discourse – a discourse that remains egocentric and monological.” [p. 67]. In such a reduction to husserlian position he is going to overcome Heidegger’s idea of Dasein as existential being that is common to all the people. Like Husserl, Levinas focuses on the I as a source of intentional effort and ethical action. On the other hand, according to Levinas, the I is the answer to the other, resulf of dialigic interaction with the other, therefore we could not charge Levinas for the disregards to the other. But, according to Irigaray, Levinas ignores cardinal distinction between the other and the I. It could be apposite to conclude this reflection by Toumayan’s felicitous title the I for Levinas is more than the others. Levinas does not consider women as another being, he looked over “the difference between masculine and feminine subject” [p. 69] [16], he believes in “pre-given, natural unity” in human nature [p. 72]; but that one difference seems to be central for Irigaray. She also questions about pattern of Western culture where “man being he whose sex exists in showing itself and woman being she whose se exists in hiding itself” [p. 73]; therefore there are no two sexes, but only one substantial and one subsidiary. But Irigaray is not absolutely right in her reading; Levinas supposed feminine to be “origin of the very concept of alterity”.[17] Of course, sexual difference is not his main theme, but Levinas recognizes the sexual otherness: “The other sex is an alterity borne by a being as an essence and not as the reverse of its identity”. [18]/

Paul Ricouer is known to be a follower of Levinas [19], and his text “Otherwise: A reading of Emmanuel Lévinas’s Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence” [pp. 82 – 99], unlike Irigaray’s approach, is a sample of historic-philosophical reading. Although Ricoeur was going to “understand Levinas at his most difficult” [p. 82], his investigation is classical enough and the difficulties of reading are usual and conventional. The main interest in his text is directed to Levinasian “derivation of the discourse of ontology from the discourse of ethics” [p. 83], that often idea is matches also to other Levinas’s texts. Unlike Heidegger, Levinas supposes ethical action to be fundamental and primordial towards existential being. He does not consider ontology to be the basis of human being. Other commentators also share this thesis: “Heidegger and Levinas agree that ontology is without foundation. For Levinas, however, ontology is not fundamental. From its depths come horror as well as gifts”. [20].

No doubt that Philippe Crignon’s article “Figuration: Emmanuel Levinas and the Images” [pp. 100 – 125] is the clou of the collection. It is both uncommon theme and prolific approach to Levinas’s legacy. In his new perspective of research image Crignon combines Levinas’s idea of the face of the other as unseen mystical phenomenon with Bataille’s eroticism as unconceivable image of eternal desire. That approach looks to be innovatory for traditional readers, who are wont to comprehend Levinas as Jewish ethic and even Talmudic thinker, who seems to be allegedly incompatible with erotic and sexual topics: “Levinas tries to found ethics by wresting the Face of man from visibility”. [p. 101]. That is why such parallels are under a lash of armchair critics. But Crignon does not interested in what he has to say, his research devoted to the problems of visibility and imagination in Levinas in comparison with non-husserlian phenomenology by Bataille, Derrida [21], Nancy [22] and Didi-Huberman. Crignon combines ethical and erotic, he “links sacred trembling and erotic spasms to figuration” [p. 107] and stand them into sharp contrast to a sensible experience and explains why “no representation of the human body is possible”. [p. 101]. Both ethics (in Levinas) and eroticism (in Bataille) are beyond the fundamental drives to produce images, - that are not read but seen and that touch us, - to produce not signs, but figures. The face of the Other is invisible, because it is irreducible to the world of phenomena both the nudity as the being without form “characterizes the body in its erotic dimension”. [p. 104]. The face of the other is invisible, firstly, because it is wider then view, it is mystical (non-phenomenal) appearance of endless depth of the image, i.e. epiphany of what is beyond the face, and secondly, because it is always in progress, therefore its formlessness witness about endless diversity of the traces of the face. [23]. Therefore Levinas seeks to “shield the Other from the image”. [p. 120]. Paradox of image consists in that “we look at the image, we do not look through the image. It is neither an existent (it is not that of which it is an image) nor a pure nothingness; it is the double of reality, its shadow, its obscuring”. [p. 113]. But Crignon distinguishes the image from the figuration, a form as which the image in born. And he argues that “ Levinas insists on excluding the image, and the image resist in the form of figuration” [p. 124], that links with desire. Here Crignon in a lacanian manner deduces a desire from the imaginary function of psychics. I admit that such psychoanalytic idea was true for Levinas. [24]. In our face-to-face experience we should overcome this compulsion to figure and, beyond all the manifestations, reveal invisible depth of the Face of the Other.

The author of last essay “Levinas’s Other and the Culture of the Copy” [pp. 126 – 143] Edith Wyschogrod is known to be the first interpreter of Levinas into English and author of the book “Emmanuel Levinas: The Problems of Ethical Metaphysics” of 1974 and recognized expert in Levinas’s philosophy. Her essay was devoted to no less important theme in phenomenological studies: difference between the same and the other, between original and a copy, or, saying heideggerian words, between Being [Dasein] and entity [Vorhandenes]. She puts this question in relation to the culture of the copy, “in which the distinction between original and replica is undermined”. [p. 128]. For Heidegger this is not a question, because he is looking for authenticity of the self, therefore any copy look to be distortion and similarity of the original, i.e. substitution. Copy for Heidegger is the forgery. But culture of the copy asks how could one distinguish original from the multiplicity of copies? Or what does it mean to be an original? Or where is authentic I, when the subject of unconsciousness is decentered and I receive my image from the other (in Mirror Stage) and I recognize my desire that returns from the Other (in Oedipal stage)? Continuing such lacanian way of thinking, Levinas considers the subject, “for whom repetition in lived as re-identification and re-creation of the self”. [p. 128]. The symbolic order is out of the imaginary identifications of the self (in Lacan’s words) or the human being is out of obvious presence (in Levinas). The subject involved in the order that beyond the self-identity and that deal with repetition, like in Freud, who call this repetiotion as obsessional one and considers it to be beyond the plasure principle [Jenseits des Lustprinzips]. Permanent looking for the face of the Other means to chang oneself and create new identities in relation to him, because “the other cannot be located at a site” [p. 129]. Levinas looks to coincides with Lacan that “sway of the I will not cross the distance marked by the alterity of the other”. [25]. We deal with the vaieties of the Other in differences of the languge: “The face that calls the I into question is language”. [26]. The symbolic order make us to overcome an identification with the illusive self and allow to find one’s way in relation to the Other. According to Levinas: “Languaue presupposes interlocutors, a plurality”. [27]. It is not surprise that Edith Wyschogrod is an expert in Lacan too and sh was the editor of the collection “Lacan and Theoretical Discourse” (N.Y.: SUNY, 1989). The theme of relation between such unsimiliar thinkers like Levinas and Lacan became the point at issue in last years. [28].

Eventually I should mention editor’s contribution, who arrange so different texts in clear and coherence order: from historic reading (by Batnitzky, Moyn, Toumayan, and Ricoeur) to original writing on Levinas (by Irigaray, Crignon, and Wyschogod). Such an order seems to be prolific, because it firstly reminds Levinas’s ideas and prepares original reading and development of his theory.

Unfortunately, no one author pays attention to the influence of Levinasian ethics upon his famous French disciples and colleagues: Blanchot [29], Derrida, Nancy, Deleuze [30], and Lyotard [31], who in “Postmodern condition” consider Levinas and Wittgenstein to be open a new way for postmodernism. Only S. Moyn makes a reference to Derrida [p. 53] and L. Batnitzky mentiones that Levinas was “postmodern” thinker [p. 6]. Altough the last one sound to be disputable – he rather was predecessor of postmodernism – his influence on intemporary axeology is obvious. Derrida has devoted to essays of of 1963 and 1996 to Levinas’s investigation of the source of human being and he use his Otherness as an ethical imperative in his own conception of Difference. In further works Derrida also analyses the conception of “trace” craeted by Nietzsche, Freud and Levinas.[32] These thee thinkers (with Marx and Husserl) seems to be the key ones both for Derrida and post-modern culture.[33]

1 On the same theme see: [1] Beavers A.F. Levinas Beyond the Horizons of Cartesianism. N.Y.: Peter Lang, 1995; [2] Keenan D.K. Reading Levinas Reading Descartes’ "Meditations".// Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. No. 1 (29), 1998. – p. 63 – 74;

2 On relationship between Levinas and Heidegger in Samuel Moyn see pp. 43 – 48;

3 On critics of Heidegger in Levinas see: [1] Levinas E. De l’existent a l’existence. Paris: Fontaine, 1947; [2] Levinas E. En decouvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger. Paris: Vrin. 1949; [3] Manning R.J.S. Interpreting Otherwise than Heidegger: Emmanuel Levinas’s Ethics as First Philosophy. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1993;

4 Man P. de Dialogue and Dialogism.// Man P. de The Resistance to Theory, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. – pp. 110;

5 On relationship between Levinas and Karl Barth see: [1] Smith S.G. The Argument to the Other: Reason beyond Reason in the Thought of Karl Barth and Emmanuel Levinas. Chicago: Scholars Press, 1983; [2] Ward G. The Revelation of the Holy Other as the Wholly Other: Between Barth"s Theology of the Word and Levinas’s Philosophy of Saying.// Modern Theolog. No. 2 (9), 1993. – pp. 159 – 180;

6 On relationship between Levinas and Rosenzweig see: [1] Cohen R.A. Elevation. The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994; [2] Gibbs R. Correlations in Rosenzweig and Levinas. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992;

7 Atterton P. “Every one of us is responsible . . . and I most of all”: The Influence of Dostoyevsky on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.// Emmanuel Levinas and the 19th Century. Ed. by Donald Wehrs and David Haney. Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2005; On Levinas’s ethics and Russian literature see: Eskin M. Ethics and Dialogue: In the Works of Levinas, Bakhtin, Mandel"shtam, Celan, London: Open University Press, 2000;

8 Bakhtin M.M. Problemi poetiki Dostoevskogo [The Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics]. Moscow, 1929. – p. 11;

9 Ibid. – p. 294;

10 Levinas E. Totalite et infini: Essai sur l’exteriorite. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961. – p. 169;

11 Olshansky D.A. Bakhtin and Levinas on Religious Tradition of Dialogue in Fyodor Dostoevsky.// Reports of International Conference “Dostoevsky and World Culture”. Karaganda, 2002. – pp. 85 – 93;

12 Levinas E. Le dialogue: conscience de soi et proximite du prochain.// Levinas E. De Dieu qui vient a l"idee. Paris: Vrin, 1982. – p. 229;

13 Lee K. An Interesting Non-Alibi in Being: A Levinasian Encounter with Bakhtin.// Thought on the Threshold on New Century. Vol. 2. Ed. by Dmitry A. Olshansky. Yekaterinburg: Urals State University, 2001. – pp. 8 – 13;

14 Irigaray L. Levinas and the Feminine.// Re-Reading Levinas. Ed. by Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991. – pp. 109 – 146; Secondary sources: [1] McDonald D.N. Moving Beyond the Face Through Eros: Levinas and Irigaray"s Treatment of the Women As an Alterity.// Philosophy Today. No. 42, 1998. – pp. 71 – 75; [2] Vasseleu C. Textures of Light: Vision and Touch in Irigaray, Levinas and Merleau-Ponty. London: routledge, 1998;

15 Cohen R.A. Elevation. The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. – p. 195;

16 On the difference feminine and masculine in Levinas see: Levinas E. Judaism and Feminine. Transl. by Edith Wyschogod.// Judaism, No. 1, 1969. – pp. 30 – 38; Secondary sources on feminine ethics in Levinas: [1] Atterton P. Derrida"s Gift to Levinas – The Feminine.// International Studies in Philosophy. No. 2 (32), 2003. – pp. 1 – 26; [2] Butler D. Engendering Questions: Developing Feminsit Ethics With Levinas.// Philosophy and the Contemporary World. No. 1 (7), 2000. – pp. 13 – 19; [3] Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas. Ed. by Tina Chanter. University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 2001; [4] Chanter T. Feminism and the Other.// The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other. Ed. by Robert Bernasconi and David Wood. London, Routledge, 1988. – pp. 32 – 56; [5] Chanter T. Time, Death, and the Feminine: Levinas with Heidegger, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001; [6] Chapman H. Levinas and the Concept of the Feminine.// Warwick Journal of Philosophy. No. 1, 1988. – p. 65 – 83; [7] Katz C. Levinas, Judaism, and the Feminine: The Silent Footsteps of Rebecca. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003;

17 Levinas E. Ethique et infini. Paris: Fayard, 1982. – p. 66;

18 Levinas E. Totalite et infini: Essai sur l’exteriorite. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961. – p. 121;

19 On Levinas’s ideas in Ricoeur see: Ricoeur P. In Memoriam: Emmanuel Levinas.// Philosophy Today. No. 3 (40), 1996. – pp. 331 – 340; Secondary sources: [1] Bourgeois P. Ricoeur and Levinas: Solicitude in Reciprocity and Solitidue in Existence.// Ricouer as Another: The Ethics of Subjectivity. Ed. by Richard A. Cohen and James L. Marsh. Albany: SUNY Press, 2002. – pp. 109 – 126; [2] Cohen R. Moral Selfhood: A Levinasian Resonse to Ricoeur on Levinas.// Ricouer as Another: The Ethics of Subjectivity. Ed. by Richard A. Cohen and James L. Marsh. Albany: SUNY Press, 2002. – pp. 127 – 160; [3] Kemp P. Ricoeur between Heidegger and Levinas: Original Affirmation between Ontological Attestation and Ethical Injunction.// Philosophy and Social Criticism. No. 5/6 (21),1995. – pp. 41 – 61; [4] Rapaport H. Face to Face with Ricoeur and Levinas.// Meanings in Texts and Actions: Questioning. Ed. by David E. Klemm and William Schweiker. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993. – pp. 226 – 233;

20 Cohen R.A. Elevation. The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. – p. 293;

21 Derrida has written his first text on Levinas in 1963 and it was published as: Derrida J. Violence et metaphysique: Essai sur la pensee d’Emmanuel Levinas.// Derrida J. L’ecriture et la differance, Paris: Les Editions de Seuil, 1967; [English version see: Derrida J. Violenca and Metaphisics.// Derrida J. Writing and Difference. Transl by Alan Bass. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978. – pp. 79 – 153]. Second one was given as his speech on December 27, 1995, and was published as: Derrida J. Adieu a Emmanuel Levinas.// l’Arche, le mensuel du judaisme francais. No. 459, February, 1996; It was also published as a book by Les Editions de Galilee in 1997. [English version see: Derrida J. Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas. Transl. by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas.// Critical Inquiry. Vol. 23, No. 1, 1996. – pp. 1 – 10]. He also writes in “Of Grammatology”: “Thus, I relate this concept of trace to what is at the center of the latest work of Emmanuel Levinas and his critique of ontology: relationship to the illeity as to the alterity of a past that never was and can never be lived in the originary or modified form of presence”. (Derrida J. De la grammatologie. Paris: Les Editions du Minuit, 1967. – p. 198). On Levinas’s influence on Derrida see: [1] Cohen R.A. Derrida’s (Mal)reading of Levinas.// Cohen R.A. Elevation. The Height of the Good in Rosenzweig and Levinas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. – pp. 305 – 321; [2] Critchley S. The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992; [3] Duncan D.M. The Pre-text of Ethics: On Derrida and Levinas. N.Y.: Peter Lang, 2001; [4] Llewelyn J. Appositions of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas. Bloomington: Indiana University press, 2001; [5] May T. Reconsidering Difference: Nancy, Derrida, Levinas, Deleuze. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1997;

22 Nancy J.-L. Visitation (de la peinture chretienne). Paris: Les Editions du Galilee, 2001;

23 On the mystical maintenance of Trace of the Other see: The Face of the Other and the Trace of God: Essays on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas, ed. by Jeff Bloechl. New York: Fordham University Press, 2000;

24 Catherine Clement agrees that psychoanalytic discourse is closed to Levinas. For example, she considers that Levinas investigates Talmud like psychoanalyst research at a seance. See her Le feminin et le sacre. Paris: Les Editions du Grasset, 1998; See his lectures on Talmud: [1] Levinas E. Quatre lectures talmudiques. Paris: Les Editions du Minuit, 1968; [2] Levinas E. Du sacre au saint. Cino nouvells lectures talmudiques. Paris: Les Editions du Minuit, 1977; [3] Levinas E. L’au-dela du Verset. Lectures et discours talmudiques. Paris: Les Editions du Minuit, 1982; [4] Levinas E. Nouvelles lectures talmudiques. Paris: Les Editions du Minuit, 1996;

25 Levinas E. Totalite et infini: Essai sur l’exteriorite. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961. – p. 38;

26 Ibid. – p. 171;

27 Ibid. – p. 73;

28 For example, see: [1] Critchley S. “Das Ding": Lacan and Levinas.// Research in Phenomenology. 1998, No. 28, pp. 72 – 90; [2] Critchley S. The Original Traumatism: Levinas and Psychoanalysis.// Question Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy. Ed. by Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley. London: Routledge, 1999. – p. 230 – 242; [3] Fryer D.R. The Intervention of the Other. Ethical Subjectivity in Levinas and Lacan. London: Other Press, 2005; [4] Gans S. Lacan and Levinas: Towards an Ethical Psychoanalysis.// Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. No.1 (28), Jan 1997, pp. 30 – 48; [5] Gelhard D. Metaphors of the Unspeakable – On the Conception of the Other in the Writing of Bakhtin, Lacan and Levinas.// New Zealand Slavonic Journal, 1998, pp. 177 – 188; [6] Jagodzinski J. The Ethics of the “Real” in Levinas, Lacan, and Buddhism: Pedagogical Implications.// Educational Theory. No. 1 (52). 2002, pp. 81 – 96; [7] Levinas and Lacan: The Missed Encounter. Ed. by Sarah Harasym. N.Y.: SUNY, 1998; [8] Lingis A. Emmanuel Levinas and the Intentional Analysis of the Libido.// Philosophy in Context. No. 8, 1978. – pp. 60 – 69; [9] Olshansky D.A. Face of the Other and the Name of the Father. An Encounter between Levinas and Lacan.// Philosophy Bridging Cultures and Civilizations. Varna, 2006. (forthcoming); [10] Reinhard K. Kant with Sade, Lacan with Levinas.// MLN. No. 110, 1995. – pp. 785 – 808; [11] Vasseleu C. The Face Before the Mirror Stage.// Hypatia. Fall 1991. – pp. 140 – 155;

29 On relationship between Levinas and Blanchot see: [1] Critchley S. II y a – A Dying Stronger than Death (Blanchot with Levinas).// Oxford Literary Review. No. 1-2 (15), 1993. – p. 81 – 131; [2] Davies P. A Linear Narrative? Blanchot with Heidegger in the Work of Levinas.// Philosophers" Poets, 1990. – p. 37 – 69; [3] Davies P. Experience and Distance: Heidegger, Blanchot, Levinas. Albany: SUNY Press, 2005; [4] Iyer L. The Sphinx"s Gaze. Art, Friendship and Philosophical in Blanchot and Levinas.// Southern Journal of Philosophy. No. 2 (39). – p. 189 – 206; [5] Libertson J. Proximity, Levinas, Blanchot, Bataille and Communication.// Phaenomenologica. No. 87, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982; [6] Mole G.D., Levinas, Blanchot, Jabes: Figures of Estrangement. Gainesville, Florida University Press, 1997; [7] Purcell M. The Question Is: A Consideration of the Question in Rahner, Blanchot and Levinas.// Irish Theological Quarterly. No. 3-4 (61), 1995. – p. 272 – 288; [8] Wall T.C. Radical Passivity: Levinas, Blanchot, and Agamben. N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1999.

30 On relationship between Levinas and Deleuze see: [1] Faber R. De-Ontologizing God: Levinas, Deleuze, and Whitehead.// Process and Difference: Between Cosmological and Poststructuralist Postmodernisms. Ed. by Catherine Keller. Albany: SUNY Press, 2002. – p. 209 – 234; [2] May T. Reconsidering Difference: Nancy, Derrida, Levinas, Deleuze. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1997;

31 On relationship between Levinas and Lyotard see: [1] Lyotard J.-F. Jewish Oedipu.// Driftworks. N.Y.: Semiotext(e), 1984. – pp. 35 – 55; [2] Lyotard J.-F. Levinas’ Logic.// Face to Face with Levinas. Ed. by Richard A. Cohen. Albany: SUNY Press, 1986. – p. 117 – 158; [3] Lyotard J.-F. The Differend. Transl. by Georges van Den Abheele. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988; [4] De Vries H. On Obligation: Lyotard and Levinas.// Graduate Faculty Journal. No. 1-2 (20-21), 1998. – p. 83 – 112;

32 Levy Z. On Emmanuel Levinas’s Concepts of "Trace" and "Otherness" and their Relationship to the Thought of Jacques Derrida.// Ultimate Real Mean, No. 4 (18), 1995. – p. 289 – 302;

33 On Levinas’s place in postmodern culture see: [1] Ajzenstat O. Driven Back to the Text: The Premodern Sources of Levinas’s Postmodernism. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001; [2] Gibson A. Postmodernity, Ethics and the Novel: From Leavis to Levinas. London: Routledge, 1999.

Dmitry A. Olshansky , B.A. (Urals), M.A. (St. Petersburg)
P.O. box 16
St. Petersburg
Russia 198261
e-mail: Olshansky@hotmail.com

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